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Almost Like Waging War
Tom Regan and the Conditions 
for Using Violence for the Sake of Animals
Federico Zuolo




This paper investigates Tom Regan’s attitude towards violence as a litmus test to under-
stand the justifiability of the use of violence in animal rights activists (ARAs). Although 
Regan’s take seems uncontroversially against a recourse to violence, there is an ambiguity 
in his position. By comparing Regan’s conditions for the legitimate use of violence for 
the sake of animal liberation with the standard conditions for jus ad bellum, I show that 
Regan construed the conditions for the former in a specular manner as the conditions for 
the latter. However, since he was not an absolute pacifist, there is some contradiction, and 
he should have been more willing to justify some recourse to violence than he in fact does. 
I conclude by gesturing towards some possible changes that his thought should undergo in 
order to adjust this incoherence. 
Keywords: absolute pacifism; animal ethics; animal politics; animal rights; 
animal rights activism; animal rights advocacy; Gandhi; jus ad bellum; Tom 
Regan; violence.
1. introduction
Violence has always been a crux for animal rights activists (ARAs). While 
most important theorists have certainly shied away from violence, some 
prominent strands of activists have sometimes taken a violent route. 
Establishing why this has occurred in practice is not the purpose of this 
paper  1. Rather, I want to investigate the possible theoretical grounds for 
 1 But we can at least suppose that the cause could have been one of the following: 
because of a lack of alternatives, the animosity of the animal righters in question or 
Relations – 7.1-2 - November 2019
https://www.ledonline.it/Relations/ - Online ISSN 2280-9643 - Print ISSN 2283-3196
Federico Zuolo
78
the use of violence in one of the most important figures of the animal 
rights movement: Tom Regan. The importance of this figure in the field 
of animal rights and in the animal rights movement cannot be under-
estimated. As known, he was the philosophical founder of the animal 
rights position. Although he is probably less known than Peter Singer in 
the general public, his influence on the study and movement of animal 
rights has probably been more significant than Singer’s. Hence, reference 
to this figure in terms of animal rights activism is uncontroversial. But 
how come he can be mentioned when talking about violence? This may 
strike one as a shocking reference. Regan was a theorist of equal rights, a 
radical theorist, but certainly not violent. And yet he has a more complex 
position than it seems at a first glance, or so I will argue.
This paper claims that there is an ambiguity and potential contradic-
tion in Regan’s attitude towards violence and political activism for the 
sake of animals. Although he does not shy away from the possibility that 
violence might be needed under certain circumstances, thus rejecting 
absolute pacifism, he says that such conditions are never met in practice. 
However, his overall position and the conditions he lays out for violent 
activism are more likely to justify violence than he admits. By means of 
a comparison between Regan’s considerations on violence and just war 
theory, we will see that Regan is admittedly less supportive of violence 
than his theory would afford. This ambiguity leaves us in the face of a 
difficult choice: that either Regan’s theory should be changed or those 
who subscribe to Regan’s animal rights theory should support violence. 
2. AnimAl rights in prActice And violence
This choice of focusing on Regan is not difficult to explain. He was sup-
portive of ARAs and he is somewhat the ideologue of many animal rights 
movements in virtue of radicality and egalitarianism. Hence, analyzing 
Regan’s theory as to the problem of violence is urgent to the extent that 
Regan as well as many other theorists in animal rights are committed to 
making his thought practically relevant. 
Here we are not discussing the feasibility of the animal rights ideal, 
although this is connected. Rather we are discussing the problem of vio-
lence, whether violence is admissible to rescue animals or to advance the 
because beliefs in animal rights have become for many people the functional equivalent 
of religion in terms of commitment, integrity and meaning in life (Jamison et al. 2000) 
which means that this has fostered the equivalent of fundamentalism in some people.
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cause of animal rights. To make sense of this issue we should put it in a 
wider context of what it means to seek to bring about the animal rights 
ideal  2. First and foremost, it means trying to convince people as indi-
viduals by means of rational and emotional persuasion. That was ARAs’ 
initial strategy, and is still the preferred strategy of many supporting the 
animal rights movement. This strategy based on individual conviction has 
been partially supplemented by more political initiatives aimed at con-
vincing authorities (for instance, to ban some specific practices or change 
some laws) or aimed at being represented in parliament or in independ-
ent authorities. In ARAs there has been a very complex and multifaceted 
interaction between the drive to achieve the ideal and the need to live 
this ideal in daily activities. A classical tension between uncompromis-
ing approaches and more compromising ones has taken place (Francione 
1996; Hall 2006). If in the first wave of animal rights debate the main 
point was about convincing people to change their values and lives, in 
the next waves ARAs turned to the issue of how to change practices and 
structures in a reluctant society. In between the two factions there are 
a number of other types of strategies and actions that have sparked an 
interesting debate. Let me just mention two of them. The first is whether 
some violations of the law for the sake of animals may qualify as acts of 
(possibly legitimate) civil disobedience (McCausland et al. 2013). ARAs 
who have taken a footage of abuses on animals in contravention with 
legal requirements with a view to publicly denouncing this abuse may be 
considered civil disobedients and be guaranteed a correspondent moral 
and legal status. The second kind of acts that I want to mention is that 
of animal rescue. Many ARAs have supported the moral compellingness 
of the case for animal rescue because, they argue, in freeing animals from 
exploitative premises and putting them in sanctuaries activists are doing 
several things: saving some specific animals from a life of suffering and 
premature death, levying the costs of practices involving animals and 
sending a message to the overall public. Some argue that the unlawful 
dimension in animal rescue should, accordingly, be granted the same 
legal and moral status as civil disobedience (Milligan 2017).
Despite the proliferation of such initiatives, many ARAs are dissat-
isfied with the outcome of the movement of animal liberation. Part of 
this dissatisfaction stems from the fact that societies and governments 
are inertial, and even though many steps forward have been made, the 
goal that ARAs still pursue is far from being achieved. So the question is: 
what should ARAs do in the face of insurmountable inertia? Is it always 
 2 For a more complete overview of ARAs strategies, see Murno 2005.
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necessary to abide by the law? Is it not sometimes necessary to break 
the law for the sake of a superior good? Many ARAs point to the case 
of liberation from slavery or resistance to unjust regimes as analogous 
to the liberation of animals  3. These movements were not only illegal but 
also sometimes violent. Should ARAs not be allowed to act in a violent 
manner too?
Although this is an intricate question that we cannot fully answer 
here, we should now have a clearer grasp of what violence means. Let us 
start with some examples. Of course, harming people counts as violence. 
But what about destruction of property, intimidation, arson of research 
facilities, sabotage of places, or campaigns of psychological pressure 
towards researchers? These are illegal and morally problematic practices 
that have been employed by some activists in a number of campaigns 
(think, for instance, of the Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty – SHAC). 
Such campaigns and other initiatives have also deployed illegal, but not 
necessarily violent, strategies, such as trespass of property, unauthorized 
footage on a private farm, and so on. Where should we draw the line and 
distinguish between illegal and violent? 
Some ARAs say that ARAs are not violent because violence can be 
addressed only to sentient beings, while such groups as ALF are commit-
ted not to harming any sentient beings, even though such actions involve 
illegal acts (sabotage, vandalism, destruction of property and so on).Vio-
lence is an ambiguous concept and defining it exceeds the scope of this 
paper. On this, it seems plausible to follow Morreall:
Acts of violence are always acts which “get at” persons. Unless the 
destruction of some physical object will “get at” a person, it is not an act 
of violence. Throwing rocks through the windows of my neighbor’s new 
car would be an act of violence: throwing rocks through the windows of 
a junked car at the city dump (assuming that this has no ecological over-
tones nor makes it harder for dump personnel to dispose of the car) would 
not be an act of violence. (Morreall 1976, 38)
However, this plausible idea does not provide unequivocal criteria 
because the perception of what it means to “get at” a person or when a 
person’s psychological unity is violated may vary from person to person. 
 3 Regan has a more nuanced position on this issue: “I am not in any way suggesting 
that the animal rights movement and the antislavery movement are in every respect the 
same (clearly, they are not), any more than I would be suggesting that all African Ameri-
cans must be either gay or lesbian because there are similarities between the movement 
to liberate slaves, on the one hand, and the gay and lesbian movement, on the other. 
Similarities are just that: similarities” (Regan 2001, 141). 
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For the purposes of this paper we do not need to settle this issue. Indeed, 
Regan says that psychological violence is violence, and that destroying 
property is a form of violence:
If someone blows up a truck, torches a lab, or sinks an illegal whal-
ing vessel, they do serious violence even if no one is hurt. To describe 
these acts as “nonviolent” is to misdescribe them, the way the military 
does when it describes civilians who are killed or maimed as “collateral 
damage”. Nonetheless, the fact that the destruction of property counts as 
violence does not by itself make such destruction wrong. Whether the act 
is wrong remains an open question, one that cannot be answered merely 
by appealing to what words mean. (Regan 2001, 140) 
3. cAn regAn ever justify violence for the sAke 
 of AnimAls? 
Now we are in a position to properly discuss Regan’s take on this. The 
remarkable fact is that he seems to be quite honest and not reticent in 
addressing this issue. Given its importance for this paper, let me cite it 
at length:
ARAs who think that arson and other forms of destruction of property are 
forms of “nonviolent direct action” are free to think what they will. Cer-
tainly nothing I say can make them change their minds. I will only observe 
that, in my opinion, unless or until these advocates accept the fact that 
some ARAs use violence in the name of animal rights (for example, when 
they firebomb empty research labs), the general public will turn a deaf ear 
when their spokespersons attempt to justify such actions.
So the real question, I believe, is not whether some ARAs use violence. 
The real question is whether they are justified in doing so. Here are the 
main outlines of a possible justification. 
 1. Animals are innocent.
 2. Violence is used only when it is necessary to rescue them so that they 
are spared terrible harm.
 3. Excessive violence is never used.
 4. Violence is used only after nonviolent alternatives have been exhausted, 
as time and circumstances permit. 
 5. Therefore, in these cases, the use of violence is justified. (Regan 2004, 
233) 
In sum, Regan’s position is conditional as he does not reject violence in 
principle, but rather establishes the conditions under which it is permis-
sible (if not mandatory?). After all we admit that sometimes violence may 
be necessary for instance in order to save kidnapped children. In another 
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part of the essay we are discussing here, Regan establishes the three main 
conditions for the use of violence to be admissible: it should be aimed at 
defending an innocent subject; it should not be excessive; all other non-
violent alternatives have been exhausted. Hence, these short principles 
reformulate the idea that violence should be used to defend a just cause, 
there should be proportionality and it should be a strategy of last resort. 
Let us call them Justice, Proportionality, and Last resort. 
It seems clear that Justice and Proportionality can easily be met by 
ARAs. After all, the defense of animals should count as a just cause, and 
probably the most just cause, because in Regan’s view animals are the 
most typically exploited innocent subjects of our world. As to Proportion-
ality, it depends on how violence is actually exerted. But it is not difficult 
to imagine the cases that meet this criterion. Suppose, for instance, that 
a group of ARAs break into an industrial farm at nighttime and without 
any harm to people, to liberate hundreds of animals. This action, if justi-
fied, is certainly proportional. 
More difficult to understand is Last resort. What does “alternatives 
have been exhausted” mean? It can be understood in an intensional or 
extensional sense. In the former sense, it means that all types of manners 
and strategies have been exhausted because, for instance, ARAs have 
employed both rational persuasion and more emotional communications; 
both attempts to convince people individually in their private lives and 
to seize power by means of political campaigns, and so on and so forth. 
In the latter sense, “nonviolent alternatives” can mean that exten-
sionally all people have been reached in a certain period. The two senses 
should of course be combined. But the specification of the extensional 
and intensional dimensions shows us the potential ambiguity of this 
phrase. Regan seems to set up the condition in such a way that it can 
never be met. Indeed, to mitigate this he adds “as time and circumstances 
permit”. This leaves the application of this principle quite open to con-
textual interpretation. It may mean that it is never met if we allow for a 
strict interpretation, or it maybe very permissive if we put emphasis on 
the time and circumstances clause. Is Regan’s interpretation of his own 
principle consistent? It seems that in some cases this condition may be 
met and that excluding it a priori is unjustified.
A strict interpretation for a limited use of violence to stop something 
specific seems unwarranted because here we limit the scope and rel-
evance of our interest to what is at stake. For instance, it maybe the case 
that all available means in a certain time-frame – say a year – have been 
exhausted to close a certain purportedly exploitative premise. It cannot 
mean that all means have been put in place in order to stop all exploita-
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tion of animals, because this interpretation would be too demanding and 
would never be satisfied. Thus, the clause of Last resort requiring that 
“nonviolent alternatives have been exhausted, as time and circumstances 
permit” should be interpreted in a permissive sense. In other words, it 
should mean that all alternatives actually available to a specific group of 
ARAs have been exhausted, given what such people can do to achieve a 
certain specific goal. If interpreted in this plausible sense, then the condi-
tion of Last resort can easily be met and violence justified. 
Regan goes on to argue that violent ARAs are blamed for their vio-
lence which is nothing compared to the ordinary violence suffered by 
animals in daily practices of exploitation. But irrespective of this, he 
holds that the case for the use of violence for the sake of animals should 
be rejected because the necessary conditions are not met:
Personally, I don’t think the second premise is true [Violence is necessary 
to rescue animals] of all or even most of the violence done in the name of 
animal rights. Why not? Because the vast majority of this violence does 
not involve animal rescue. The vast majority (I estimate 98 percent) is 
property destruction, pure and simple. In cases like these, the defense we 
are considering contributes nothing by way of justification. Why of the 
remaining two percent of cases, cases where violence is used and animals 
are rescued? For example, suppose a multi-million-dollar lab is burnt to 
the ground after the animals in it have been liberated. Would this kind of 
violence be justified, given the argument sketched above? 
Again, I don’t think so. And the reason I don’t think so is that I don’t 
think the requirement set forth in premise 4 has been satisfied. Personally, 
I do not think that ARAs in general, members of the ALF in particular, 
have done nearly enough when it comes to exhausting nonviolent alterna-
tives. (Regan 2004, 234) 
Unlike what seems to follow from previous considerations, here Regan 
says that de facto the case for the use of violence when it comes to animals 
is not met. 
4. WAging WAr And defending AnimAls 
At this point it is helpful to compare the requirement of Last resort in this 
domain with other uses of it. Last resort has been appealed to in a vast 
range of cases: in the ethics of war, in the justification of whistleblow-
ing, in the justification of palliative care, and other cases involving the 
admissibility of violation of the law or matters of life and death. In these 
areas sometimes deviations from ordinary moral rules (for instance, of 
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non-intervention, non-maleficence, or of compliance with rules) seem to 
be justified for the sake of preventing a greater evil or of promoting a 
higher good. 
The striking fact is that Regan’s conditions for the use of violence are 
very close to the jus ad bellum conditions. Let us see them briefly in their 
canonical form.
 1. Just cause;
 2. Proportionality;
 3. A reasonable chance of success;
 4. Legitimate authority;
 5. Right intention;
 6. Last resort;
 7. Public declaration of war. (Frowe 2011, 50)
I do not mean to say that the case for animals should be understood as 
a war, although some theorists (Bernstein 2004; Kemmerer 2008) and 
ARAs (in particular the Animal Liberation Front) have claimed so. I 
imagine Regan would not agree with this equivalence. However, the way 
he construes the case for the use of violence for the sake of animals is 
substantially equivalent to the conditions for jus ad bellum. As it is easy 
to see Regan’s first point (Animals are innocent) provides the just cause 
principle. The second condition (Violence is used only when it is nec-
essary to rescue them so that they are spared terrible harm) includes a 
just cause condition (just cause as defense of others) plus a part of the 
proportionality clause. Regan’s third point expresses the proportionality 
condition (Excessive violence is never used). The fourth condition (Vio-
lence is used after nonviolent alternatives have been exhausted) is the last 
resort principle. Furthermore, the right intention principle is certainly 
included in the first two conditions (just cause and principle of rescue). 
And we could also suppose that some ARAs also meet the requirement 
of public declaration of war to the extent that the public statements in 
which they express their intention to become violent can count as sui 
generis public declarations. Then, what is missing here? The reasonable 
chance of success principle and the legitimate authority condition are 
missing. As to the legitimate authority condition, we can say that this 
condition is often unmet by many wars, which are nowadays combated 
by non-state actors. Moreover, in the case of animals, probably no state 
can currently satisfy this condition in so far as the exploitation of animals 
is a widespread practice about which no state can claim to be immune 
(Cochrane and Cooke 2016). Hence, paradoxically a non-state actor, if it 
can in some sense wage a sort of war, could probably be more entitled to 
wage war against others than states are. 
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As to the reasonable chance of success, it does not apply here because 
(i) it depends on the definition of success (whether in terms of saving an 
animal or freeing animals from human domination in general), (ii) the 
whole animal liberation movement could not meet this condition in a 
general sense (at least in a short-medium term) but this does not make it 
impractical, (iii) the relevant timeframe is to be defined. 
It seems, then, the conditions required by Regan for the permissible 
use of violence for the sake of animals are substantially coincident with 
those for the case of just war, notwithstanding some discrepancies, which 
do not affect the overall impression. 
Building on this, Regan uses these conditions not to argue in favor 
of the use of violence for the sake of animals. On the contrary he uses 
these conditions to argue against the use of violence because he thinks 
that these conditions are never met. However, unlike the case of violence 
for the sake of animals, Regan does not support an absolute pacifism as 
to war:
Mahatma Gandhi has had a profound influence on my life. I think it is 
fair to say that I would never have become an animal rights advocate if I 
had not read his autobiography. […] [But] [p]acifism is one place Gandhi 
went where I never have been able to go. He teaches that the use of vio-
lence is always wrong, even in defense of those who have done no wrong, 
those who are innocent. […] Maybe it’s my blue-collar background, but I 
have always believed that anyone who smites me (or my wife or our chil-
dren, for example) is looking for trouble. Depending on the circumstances 
(the attacker is not carrying a gun, for example) I hope I would have the 
courage to do some serious smiting back. […] Sometimes, in some cir-
cumstances, violence is justified. That’s what the rest of us believe. Where 
we part company is over the question, “In what circumstances?”. (Regan 
2004, 231)
Thus, it seems that Regan is not an absolute pacifist who rejects violence 
and the use of force per se  4. So, if the case for violence (and war as a 
consequence) is not impossibly met, how come this is not equally the case 
for animals? This is puzzling in particular for a perspective like that of 
Regan, in which, I recall, all subjects-of-a-life (at least all mammals of at 
least an age) have equal intrinsic worth and equal rights (Regan 1983). As 
known, Regan has made the case for not discounting the interests of ani-
mals, and in particular of subjects-of-a-life, and for not considering their 
status as inferior to that of human persons. So, how come it is possible 
 4 This impression is further reinforced by an old essay in which Regan, while 
defending pacifism from some mistaken criticisms, holds that “pacifism is false, and 
profoundly so” (Regan 1972, 73). 
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that in practice it is easier to use force in case of human-human relations 
than it is with respect to human-animal relations? 
So why are a last resort in just war and a last resort in the use of 
violence for animal rights so divergent? There should be something dif-
ferent between the uses of violence to make sense of this difference. In 
what follows I will review possible answers to this question, and finally 
reject them all. I will conclude that this ambiguity in Regan’s thought 
calls for a revision of some part of his claims, in terms of the urgency of 
normative principles or the relation between human beings and animals, 
both of which can hardly be accepted by Regan’s uncompromising and 
egalitarian position.
First, we might think that just war conditions are easier to meet than 
violence for the sake of animals because human deaths count more than 
animal interests. Then, at least in some cases of jus ad bellum, namely in 
those cases in which military intervention is justified to prevent a human-
itarian crisis, a genocide, for the sake of defending an innocent and help-
less other party, we should intervene to save human lives. This should 
not strike us as immediately incoherent with Regan’s theory. Despite the 
principle of equal inherent value of all subjects of a life (including ani-
mals), Regan does not think that there is no difference in the values of 
lives all things considered. In the lifeboat example he clearly says that 
we should let the dog, rather than a person, die (Regan 1983, 324). But 
this is because human persons have much richer life prospects than a 
dog. However, this response seems misplaced because, violence for the 
sake of animals is not comparable to war in the proper sense. Rather, 
this argument would be a sensible one to limit the admissible violence 
to people, thus excluding death but perhaps not excluding minor physi-
cal injuries or psychological violence, which Regan clearly recognizes as 
forms of violence. 
Second, one may think that violence for the sake of animals is more 
difficult to justify than violence involved in war because the atroci-
ties caused by a war are more serious than those involved in ordinary 
practices of animal exploitations. I guess this would be the response of 
many well-meaning supporters of the cause of animals who are, though, 
reluctant to take the egalitarian rights-based path. Although such per-
sons consider animal suffering morally relevant, they are at pains with 
giving equal prominence to human and animal suffering. However, this 
is certainly not Regan’s perspective. The life of a non-human animal may 
contain fewer opportunities and hence less comparative value, although 
having the same intrinsic value qua subject of a life. But the number of 
animals involved is so much bigger than the number of people involved 
Relations – 7.1-2 - November 2019
https://www.ledonline.it/Relations/ - Online ISSN 2280-9643 - Print ISSN 2283-3196
Almost Like Waging War
87
in possible acts of violence towards persons that we should feel com-
pelled by Regan’s logic to act. A related worry could ask whether in a 
Kantian-view perspective, such as Regan’s, numbers should count. Num-
bers of lives should count because Regan is Kantian and upholds intrinsic 
value but he is not committed to the idea that any life is uncountable as 
if it were sacred or noumenally unmeasurable. Indeed, in Regan’s view, 
comparisons between types of lives and their weighing is possible not via 
their inherent value, but rather via their contents, namely the kinds of 
opportunities of a life albeit not comparing intrinsic value per se. 
As a third reply, one could contest the applicability of the compari-
son between war and violence for the sake of animals because in the latter 
case we miss the institutional dimension. War used to be declared by a 
state against another state. Cochrane and Cooke (2016) argue that a state 
cannot wage a just war against other states to defend animals because no 
state can claim legitimate authority on this domain insofar as no state is 
free from the responsibility of massive exploitation of animals. But is this 
condition necessary? Although that seemed to be a standard requirement 
for distinguishing between war and other types of use of force among 
groups, this is not necessarily the case. Think of a minority group of 
people who are oppressed by a state, or civilians against a dictatorship. 
Here we lack the institutional dimension of the oppressed but there is 
a case for them to wage some kind of war. In such conditions perhaps 
we would find it inappropriate to talk about war, not only because one 
of the parties is not a state, but also because there are other conditions 
missing (non-equality of soldiers, lack of soldiers, or of proper “combat-
ants”). If we reframe the situation of the battle against the exploitation 
of animals in terms of a resistance or unconventional war, we would cer-
tainly approach the current fact of the matter in a more precise way. But 
the unwelcome implication is that the case for using violence for animals 
would be much easier than in the case of jus ad bellum. Indeed, it could 
plausibly be said that in a condition of resistance against an unjust power 
which has control over the structure of animal exploitation, one should 
not only be permitted to use violence and fight against such power, but it 
should also be required (Kemmerer 2008). Hence, if understood in this 
manner, violent ARAs would quite easily be justified. 
Related to this point, one may think that the parallel between war 
among humans and violence for the sake of animals is misplaced because 
in the case of war we can clearly distinguish combatants and civilians 
and we have different duties towards them. While this is not so in the 
case of violence for the sake of animals. But is this true? Not completely. 
In discussions about animal rights activism, we can find a number of 
Relations – 7.1-2 - November 2019
https://www.ledonline.it/Relations/ - Online ISSN 2280-9643 - Print ISSN 2283-3196
Federico Zuolo
88
distinctions among people precisely on whether they are involved, and 
the degree to which they are involved in practices of animal exploita-
tion. Hence, people such as farmers and researchers using animals in 
laboratories are not combatants, but are considered enemies insofar as 
they bear more direct responsibilities in carrying out practices harm-
ful to animals. Hence, they have been frequently treated as the favorite 
target of legal campaigns, but also of forms of psychological pressure 
and intimidation. If we follow this logic, should we conclude that all 
people except vegans are permissible targets, although to different 
degrees of responsibility, in a war against the exploitation of animals? 
That would seem way too much. How far this reasoning would take us 
cannot be established here. Suffice it here to admit that if the case for 
the liberation of animals is like an unconventional war, then there are 
no combatants on the other side, but only people who are to different 
degrees possible targets. 
Of course, this is certainly not what Regan had in mind. But this is 
what has been said by people or groups (for instance, ALF) which have 
been deeply influenced by Regan and have taken the idea that harm to 
animals is a deep cause of injustice seriously. So why does Regan himself 
not follow the logic of his theory? This is a peculiar contradiction that 
can be explained only if we hypothesize that Regan is uncharacteristically 
prudent in this case.
5. concluding remArks
How should one solve such ambiguity? The easy way could be to relax 
the Last resort condition and allow for more violence. That would seem 
the obvious conclusion but Regan does not do so. Perhaps he cautioned 
against it just as a matter of prudence or for the sake of not giving the 
opponents of animal rights the argument that animal righters are per se 
violent (and hence terrorists). Consider the difference between the two 
cases: justification of a war is usually provided in a specific context and 
for specific reasons, which is not the normal condition. While in the case 
of animals, according to Regan, we have structural exploitation. But its 
structural nature is not an excuse for its moral appeasement. It can only 
be a practical excuse for its change.
Another possible explanation is that Regan did not see it as a war. 
But if so, why did he employ the same principles of just war if in the end 
the kind of violence should be different? And different in what sense? If 
there is a difference, the kind of violence involved in war is usually much 
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more destructive than that involved in ARA activism. If so, again, this 
should put more burdens on the shoulders of the case for war rather than 
on the case for violence for animals. 
Another possibility could be to admit that standard practices, includ-
ing those involving animals, have a moral standing, while war does not. 
However, this kind of Humean or Aristotelian appreciation of the value 
of people’s entrenched practices is totally alien to Regan’s view. 
To conclude, we should perhaps leave this ambiguity in Regan’s 
thought. It is likely to be the case that this caution against the use of 
violence that seems to be justified by his very principles depended, in 
Regan’s view, on a pragmatic concern in terms of efficacy. Reference to 
Gandhi’s and Regan’s arguments give us a clue to think that he thought 
that only non-violence is in the end effective. Lurking behind his pru-
dence there is probably the assumption that what matters is convincing 
people, and you can stop an activity by levying costs or intimidating 
researchers or workers but this cannot count as convincing people. But 
admitting this amounts to severing the tight implication between prin-
ciples in theory and principles in practice to which Regan is committed 
throughout his entire theory:
My own position, as indicated earlier, is that we should be willing to take 
the strength of our convictions out of our studies and into the streets. It 
is, I think, entirely appropriate for moral philosophers to agitate politically 
and publicly for a cause in which they believe. Indeed, I am inclined to go 
further. By my lights, a willingness to gather with other partisans at the 
barricades, so to speak, is part of our wholeness as moral agents in the 
world; it is a way (though not the only one) to assess our moral integrity. 
(Regan 2001, 162)
Besides this personal commitment to advocacy, Regan made a lot of 
efforts in his theory to provide action guiding principles and priority 
rules. If from these principles and rules the possibility of violence follows 
but then this practical implication is blocked by some prudent concern, 
Regan’s overall commitment to guiding action and advocating animal lib-
eration ends up being weakened. 
If, instead, one does not want to severe the practicality of Regan’s 
principles while still refusing to allow violence, one should admit that 
the plausibility of Regan’s principles is counterbalanced by the plausibil-
ity of other considerations. Of course, Regan does not think that there 
are no other issues than animal liberation, as his multiple interests on 
other causes attest. What I mean, instead, is that the hesitance in drawing 
the practical implications of such a position should also depend on the 
recognition that people might legitimately disagree on this issue without 
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being perforce blinded by self-interest or ignorance  5. Although the pos-
sibility of reasonably disagreeing on matters of (animal) justice has always 
been rejected by nearly all animal rights theorists, admitting it may help 
animal righters reconsider the balance between the cause of animals and 
other people’s (legitimate) positions in a way that brings violence to a 
halt without thereby implying mere prudent hesitance. 
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